Research in past decades has advanced our understanding of what determines the vertical boundary of the …rm. An equally important but much less understood issue is the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance, mainly because of the endogeneity issue associated with the choice of vertical boundary (or the Coase meets Heckman problem) and the measurement problem concerning the degree of vertical integration. This paper investigates the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance by using three di¤erent data sets that complement each other in addressing both the endogeneity and measurement issues. It is found that in each of these data sets, the degree of vertical integration consistently has a negative and statistically signi…cant impact on …rm productivity.
Introduction
Since the seminal work of Ronald Coase (1937) , signi…cant progress has been made toward understanding what determines the vertical boundary of the …rm. Leading theories on the vertical boundary of the …rm include the transaction-cost theory developed by Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) , and the incomplete contract theory of the …rm developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . There is also a large body of empirical studies testing the relevance of these theories. 1 An equally important but much less studied issue is the consequences of the vertical boundary decision. 2 This lack of research is mainly due to two challenges faced in empirically investigating the impact of vertical integration. One concerns the measurement of vertical integration, as the conventional measure for vertical integration -the value added ratio (de…ned as the ratio of the di¤erence between sales and purchased raw materials to sales) -could be sensitive to the stage of the production process in which the …rm specializes (Holmes, 1999) . The other challenge stems from the fact that the degree of vertical integration is an endogenous variable, as a result of which a simple comparison of the performance of di¤erent …rms having di¤erent degrees of vertical integration may su¤er from the endogeneity problem (or the Coase meets Heckman problem, see Gibbons, 1999) . In this paper, we use three di¤erent data sets (i.e., two within-country data sets and one crosscountry data set) that are complementary in addressing the above variable measurement and endogeneity issues to investigate the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance.
Our …rst data set is from a survey of China's manufacturing …rms conducted by the World Bank in 2003. The advantage of this data set is that it contains information about the percentage of parts that are produced inhouse, with which we construct a measure of vertical integration more direct and arguably better than the conventional yardstick -the value added ratio. 1 For a review of theoretical studies, see, for example, Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005 ; for a review of empirical studies, see, for example, Klein, 2005 ; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007. 2 In their review of theoretical and empirical studies on vertical integration, Lafontaine and Slade (2007) allocate more than thirty pages to the determinants of the vertical boundary of the …rm, but devote only …fteen pages to the consequences of …rm vertical boundary decisions. Furthermore, a majority of the latter group of studies focus on the impact of …rm vertical boundary on market power and its implications for government policies regarding vertical integration. Firms making decisions on their vertical boundary are, however, equally if not more, concerned about the direct impact of vertical boundary on their performance.
The disadvantage of this data set is that we can compare only the performance of di¤erent …rms having di¤erent degrees of vertical integration, and consequently encounter the Coase meets Heckman problem. Nonetheless, following Forbes and Lederman (2010), we address this endogeneity problem by using the instrumental variable approach. Speci…cally, we use the degree of local purchase (a proxy for the extent of site speci…city) as an instrument for vertical integration, as Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 argues and many empirical studies show that the former is a determinant of the latter. Both the OLS and IV estimation results show that the degree of vertical integration is negatively correlated with …rm productivity. We then check the validity of our instrumental variable estimation, especially with respect to the exclusion restriction, by identifying and then controlling for several possible channels other than vertical integration through which the instrument may a¤ect …rm performance and also conducting a placebo test a là Angrist and Pischke (2009) . We also check the robustness of our main results to sub-sample analysis (excluding outliers, …rms with focused businesses, and private …rms).
The second data set is from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) in China for the period of 1998 to 2005. Covering all state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with sales above a certain threshold, this is the most comprehensive …rm-level data set in China, with the number of manufacturing …rms surveyed varying from 140,000 in the late 1990s to 243,000 in 2005. With this ASIF data set, we can use only the conventional measure of vertical integration -the value added ratio. Nonetheless, in the analysis, we …rst control for a detailed set of 4-digit industry dummies and then for …rm dummies, which partially addresses the measurement problem associated with vertical integration. Meanwhile, given the panel data nature of the ASIF, we are able to compare the performance of the same …rm but having di¤erent degrees of vertical integration over the sample period, thereby addressing the Coase meets Heckman estimation problem. Using various panel estimation methods, we …nd the degree of vertical integration to be negatively correlated with …rm productivity, consistent with the results we obtain using the …rst data set. This result is robust to control for time-varying factors and sub-sample analysis (balanced panel, exclusion of outliers, and private …rms).
The third data set used in this study is a standardized data set based on a series of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in 6 developing countries (i.e., Brazil, Ecuador, Oman, the Philippines, South Africa and Zambia) during the period of 2002-2006. It contains survey information about …rms' change from outsourcing to in-house production of major production activities, which allows us to measure the change in vertical integration that is arguably better than the value added ratio of the second data set and more precise than the percentage of parts produced in-house in the …rst data set. Coupled with some time series aspects of the data set, we can examine how the change in vertical integration a¤ects the change in …rm productivity, thereby addressing the Coase meets Heckman problem. First-di¤erence estimation shows that bringing major production activities in-house leads to a decrease in …rm productivity, a result consistent with our …ndings obtained using the …rst and second data sets. This …nding is robust to control for possible time-varying characteristics, and sub-sample analysis (exclusion of outliers, and private …rms).
This paper is related to Forbes and Lederman (2010) in being one of the …rst few attempts to formally address the endogeneity of …rm vertical integration decisions in investigating their impact on …rm performance. Compared with Forbes and Lederman (2010), we use three data sets that complement each other in addressing both the variable measurement and the Coase meets Heckman problems. More speci…cally, we use not only the instrumental variable approach as in Forbes and Lederman (2010) in our …rst data set, but also various panel estimation methods in the second and third data sets. In addition, our study is complementary to Forbes and Lederman (2010) in that we look at the impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity, whereas they examine its impact on operational e¢ ciency of airlines such as delays and cancellations. This paper is also related to Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) in investigating the consequences of …rm vertical boundary across a range of industries.
meets Heckman problem in developing our understanding of the impact of vertical integration. 4 The structure of the paper is as follows. Data, variables and estimation strategies are described in Section 2, and empirical …ndings are presented in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.
Data, Variables, and Estimation Strategies
There are two major challenges in investigating the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance. One concerns the measurement of vertical integration. The conventional measure for vertical integration is the value added ratio. While it is used extensively in the literature, this measure has been shown to be sensitive to the stage of the production process in which the …rm specializes. Speci…cally, the value added ratio is generally lower for …rms specializing in later stages of the production process (Holmes, 1999) .
The other challenge is that the degree of vertical integration is endogenously determined. As illustrated by Gibbons (1999) , …rms choose the degree of vertical integration based on their transaction di¢ culty. In equilibrium, vertical integration is optimal for …rms facing high transaction di¢ culty, whereas the opposite (i.e., outsourcing) is optimal for …rms encountering low transaction di¢ culty (see Figure 1 , which is copied from Gibbons (1999), for details). As a result, a simple comparison of the performance of di¤erent …rms having di¤erent degrees of vertical integration would su¤er from the endogeneity problem, also called the Coase meets Heckman problem (Gibbons, 1999). Ideally, to identify the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance, one should observe for the same …rm di¤erent values of both vertical integration and …rm performance at the same time. However, this is not possible in a non-randomized research setting.
In this study, we conduct three separate analysis, using three di¤erent cross-industry data sets (i.e., two within-country data sets and one crosscountry data set), which complement each other in addressing the above variable measurement and endogeneity issues. In what follows, we describe the data sets with a focus on the relevant measure of vertical integration and the estimation strategy adopted to address the endogeneity problem.
Survey of Chinese Enterprises
The …rst data set used in this study comes from the Survey of Chinese Enterprises (SCE) conducted by the World Bank in cooperation with the Enterprise Survey Organization of China in early 2003. A total of 18 cities were chosen, and 100 or 150 …rms from each city were randomly sampled from the 9 manufacturing industries and 5 service industries. 5 The total number of surveyed …rms is 2,400. In this study, we focus on the sub-sample of 1,566 manufacturing …rms due to the availability of data on some key variables (speci…cally, our instrumental variable for the degree of vertical integration) and to enable comparison with the analysis of the other two data sets.
The advantage of the SCE data set is that it contains a survey question explicitly designed to measure the degree of vertical integration: "what is the percentage of parts used by the …rm that are produced in-house (measured by the value of parts)?"The reply to this question is then used to construct a measure of vertical integration (denoted by Self-Made Input Percentage). In comparison with the measure of vertical integration most commonly used in the literature (the value added ratio), this measure is a direct gauge of the degree of vertical integration. Moreover, it avoids the drawback of being sensitive to the stage of the production process in which the …rm specializes (Holmes, 1999) . 6 The caveat, however, is that managers at di¤erent companies may have a di¤erent understanding of what constitutes their inputs. This may explain why some …rms report 100% in-house production of their inputs, while others have zero input production, resulting in signi…cant variation of the measure (speci…cally, with a mean value of 0:339 and a standard deviation of 0:401). To address the subjectivity of this measure, we control for industry dummies in the regression analysis so we compare …rms in the same industry, in which there is a more or less common understanding of what constitutes parts used in their production activities. 7 5 The 18 cities are: 1) Benxi, Changchun, Dalian and Haerbin in the Northeast; 2) Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen and Wenzhou in the Coastal area; 3) Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan and Zhengzhou in Central China; 4) Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming and Nanning in the Southwest; 5) Lanzhou and Xi'an in the Northwest. The 14 industries are: 1) manufacturing: garment and leather products, electronic equipment, electronic parts making, household electronics, auto and auto parts, food processing, chemical products and medicine, biotech products and Chinese medicine, metallurgical products; and 2) services: transportation services, information technology, accounting and non-banking …nancial services, advertising and marketing, and business services. 6 We consulted with the designer of the SCE, Dr. Colin Xu of the World Bank. He explained that the rationale for including a survey question on the degree of vertical integration was precisely because of the well-known problems associated with the conventional measure of vertical integration. 7 Dr. Colin Xu further explained that while the actual survey was carried out by the The disadvantage of this data set, however, is that it does not allow us to undertake a counterfactual comparison in investigating the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance. Speci…cally, we cannot compare the performance of a …rm with that of the same …rm when it has a di¤erent degree of vertical integration. Instead, we can only compare the performance of a …rm of a higher degree of vertical integration with that of another …rm of a lower degree of vertical integration, thereby encountering the endogeneity problem (or the Coase meets Heckman problem). Nonetheless, following some recent work in the literature (Forbes and Lederman, 2010), we address the endogeneity problem by adopting an instrumental variable approach.
Annual Survey of Industrial Firms
The second data set used in this study comes from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period of 1998 to 2005. This is the most comprehensive …rm-level data set in China, as it covers all state-owned enterprises and non-stateowned enterprises with annual sales of …ve million Renminbi 8 or more. The number of …rms varies from over 140,000 in the late 1990s to over 243,000 in 2005.
The data set contains standard accounting information on …rms' operations and performance. As a result, this ASIF data set allows us to use only the conventional, albeit objective, measure of vertical integration: Value Added Ratio. It has a mean value of 0:244 and a standard deviation of 0:164. In the regression analysis, however, we control for a full set of 4-digit industry dummies as a partial way of dealing with the problem that this measure could be sensitive to the stage of production in which the …rm specializes.
The main advantage of the ASIF data set lies in its feature of being a panel data set, which allows us to examine the performance of the same …rm that has experienced a change in the degree of vertical integration over the sample period. In other words, panel estimation methods enable us to address the endogeneity problem associated with vertical integration (or the Coase meets Heckman problem) to some extent.
Enterprise Survey Organization of China's National Bureau of Statistics -an authoritative and experienced survey organization -there was no complaint from the surveyed …rms regarding the possible ambiguity of the survey question with respect to the degree of vertical integration. 8 The Chinese currency with 1 Renminbi equal to 0.15 U.S. dollars
Private Enterprise Survey of Productivity and the Investment Climate
The third data set used in this study comes from the Private Enterprise Survey of Productivity and the Investment Climate (PESPIC). It is a standardized data set based on a series of The World Bank Enterprise Surveys Although the PESPIC is a cross-sectional data set, it also has some timeseries aspects. In addition, this data set contains a survey question designed to directly measure the change in the degree of vertical integration: "has your company brought in-house of major production activities in the last three years?"The reply to this survey question is used to construct a dummy variable, Change in Vertical Integration, which takes the value of 1 if the …rm answers a¢ rmatively and 0 otherwise.
This measure of vertical integration is clearly devoid of the well-known problems associated with the conventional measure of vertical integrationthe value added ratio -used in the second data set. It is also expected to be more accurate than the yardstick employed for the …rst data set, as the survey question focuses on major production activities. More importantly, coupled with the availability of time-series data on …rm performance, we are able to investigate whether the change in a …rm's vertical integration a¤ects its …rm performance. In other words, we can approximate the ideal setting of identifying the impact of vertical integration, thereby addressing the Coase meets Heckman problem.
As the PESPIC was compiled from a series of WBESs employing di¤er-ent questionnaire designs and survey methodologies in di¤erent countries, information about the change in the sourcing strategy adopted for major production activities is available in only 6 countries (i.e., Brazil, Ecuador, Oman, the Philippines, South Africa and Zambia). After deleting observations missing valid information about ownership changes, we have a …nal sample of 3,958 …rms in these 6 developing countries. The mean value of Change in Vertical Integration is 0:097 and its standard deviation is 0:296.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is a measure of …rm performance. As we use three di¤erent data sets, each of which contains di¤erent …rm-level 9 More information about the data set can be found at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ information, we focus on a simple, standard measure of …rm performance, labor productivity, to achieve comparability across these three data sets. More speci…cally, following Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007), we measure labor productivity by the logarithm of output per worker (denoted by Labor Productivity).
As shown in Table 1 , the mean and standard deviation of Labor Productivity are 4:322 and 1:562, respectively, for the …rst data set (the SCE data set), and are 4:917 and 1:193, respectively, for the second data set (the ASIF data set). 10 The mean and standard deviation of Change in Vertical Integration for the third data set (the PESPIC data set) are 0:154 and 0:799, respectively.
3 Empirical Analysis 3.1 Analysis Using SCE Data Set
Benchmark Results
To investigate the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance using the SCE data set, we estimate the following equation:
where f , i, c denote …rm, industry and city, respectively; Y f is …rm f 's productivity; V I f is …rm f 's degree of vertical integration (speci…cally, Self-Made Input Percentage, constructed on the basis of …rm f 's reply to the survey question "what is the percentage of parts used by the …rm that are produced in-house (measured by the value of parts)?"); X 0 f ic is a vector of control variables including …rm characteristics, 11 CEO characteristics, 12 city dummies 10 While both the …rst and second data sets are about Chinese manufacturing …rms, mean productivity in the second data set is higher than that in the …rst data set, presumably because the second data covers non-state-owned enterprises above a certain sales threshold. 11 Variables related to …rm characteristics include: Firm Size (measured as the logarithm of …rm employment), Firm Age (measured as the logarithm of years of establishment), Percentage of Private Ownership (measured as the percentage of equity owned by parties other than government agencies) and Capital Intensity (measured as the logarithm of assets per worker). 12 The CEO characteristics include measures of human capital -Education (years of schooling), Years of Being CEO (years as CEO) and Deputy CEO Previously (an indicator of whether the CEO had been the deputy CEO of the same …rm before becoming CEO); and measures of political capital -Government Cadre Previously (an indicator of whether the CEO had previously been a government o¢ cial), Communist Party Member (an indicator of whether the CEO is a member of the Chinese Communist Party) and industry dummies; and " f is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-city level to deal with the potential heteroskedasticity problem.
The OLS regression results of equation (1) are reported in Table 2 . To avoid issues of multicollinearity and bad controls (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), we include the control variables in a stepwise fashion. It is clear that throughout these speci…cations, the estimated coe¢ cients of Self-Made Input Percentage are consistently negative and statistically signi…cant, implying that a higher degree of vertical integration is associated with lower …rm productivity. In terms of economic magnitude, from the most conservative estimate, a one-standard-deviation increase in the degree of vertical integration leads to a 2:2% decrease in …rm productivity at the mean level.
The estimated coe¢ cients of the control variables also make economic sense. For example, younger …rms and those with higher capital intensity have higher productivity, consistent with …ndings in the literature. Firms with a higher percentage of private ownership also have higher productivity. This is because state-owned enterprises in China are charged with multiple responsibilities; speci…cally, they are required to focus not only on pro…t maximization, but also on maintaining social stability, the latter of which involves excessive hiring and consequently lower productivity (Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang, 2000). The coe¢ cient of Firm Size is positive and signi…cant in all speci…cations, suggesting the presence of economies of scale. This is consistent with evidence of local protectionism within China (Young, 2000; Bai, Du, Tao, and Tong, 2004), which results in production at a sub-optimal scale. It is also worthwhile pointing out the negative impact of government appointments on …rm productivity. This result is consistent with the view that government appointments of CEOs are based on political considerations rather than managerial talent, a unique phenomenon in a transition economy such as China.
IV Estimates
The OLS estimates presented above could, however, be biased due to the fact that the vertical boundary of the …rm is endogenously determined. Speci…-cally, according to the Coase meets Heckman framework laid out by Gibbons (1999) , …rms decide whether to make or buy based on the transaction di¢ -culty they face. In equilibrium, …rms encountering low transaction di¢ culty choose a low degree of vertical integration, whereas …rms facing high transaction di¢ culty opt for a high degree of vertical integration (see Figure 1, and Government Appointment (an indicator of whether the CEO was appointed by the government).
which is copied from Gibbons, 1999 ). While we control for a list of variables related to …rm and CEO characteristics, and industry and city dummies, some variables such as transaction di¢ culty a¤ecting both …rm performance and the degree of vertical integration may still exist, which would lead to omitted variables bias.
To address the endogeneity problem associated with the degree of vertical integration (or the Coase meets Heckman problem), we would ideally like to compare the performance of the same …rm but with di¤erent degrees of vertical integration. Due to data limitation in our …rst data set, however, we follow some of the most recent studies in the literature (Forbes and Lederman, 2010) and use the instrumental variable approach to partially address the endogeneity problem.
Speci…cally, we use the ratio of a …rm's inputs purchased from the province where the …rm is located over all purchased inputs, denoted by Local Purchase, as the instrumental variable for the degree of vertical integration. As argued by Williamson (1983 Williamson ( , 1985 , …rms with higher site-speci…city vis-à-vis their suppliers have greater potential to be held up, and are thus more likely to vertically integrate the production of parts and components. This theoretical prediction has been supported by many empirical studies such as Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Masten (1984) , Joskow (1985) , Spiller (1985) and González-Díaz, Arru½ nada, and Fernández (2000). 13 The IV estimation results are presented in Table 3 . Only the industry dummy is included in Column 1, whereas all control variables are included in Column 2.
As shown in Panel B, Local Purchase is found to be positive and statistically signi…cant, which con…rms the relation between site speci…city and vertical integration (Williamson, 1983 (Williamson, , 1985 . The Anderson canonical cor- 13 Site speci…city could go hand in hand with asset speci…city. For example, an electricitygenerating plant located next to a coal mine may adjust its production technology to suit the quality of coal obtained locally, which may lead to severe holdup problems ex post. Nonetheless, we control for the input speci…city in one of our robustness checks and …nd similar results.
Moreover, even in the absence of asset speci…city, monopolistic suppliers may hold up their nearby customers by demanding higher prices because such customers would have to pay higher transport costs if purchasing from alternative and more distant suppliers. Indeed, BHP and Rio Tinto of Australia demanded for extra price increases for iron ore purchased by Chinese steel makers in 2005 and 2008 respectively, simply because they are geographically closer to China than is CVRD of Brazil, despite the same free-on-board prices of iron ore applying (Png, Ramon-Berjano, and Tao, 2006, 2009). Subsequently, many Chinese steel makers have been trying to acquire iron ore mines in Australia. Meanwhile, within China, due to high transport costs and local protectionism, both of which inhibit cross-regional trade, …rms have limited options other than purchasing locally, which further exacerbates the holdup problems associated with local purchases. relation LR statistic and the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic (reported in Panel C) further con…rm that our instrument is relevant. The F-test of excluded instrument is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level, but has a value of around 5, which is below the critical value of 10 -a value suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) as the "safety zone" for a strong instrument. This may raise a possible concern over the use of a weak instrument for our analysis. We therefore conduct two additional econometric tests: the Anderson 
With respect to our central issue, Self-Made Input Percentage, after being instrumented, still has a negative and statistically signi…cant impact on …rm productivity. Note that the IV estimates are much larger than the OLS estimates. Apparently, any bias due to the endogeneity problem serves to bias the impact of vertical integration downward rather than upward. Another possibility is that the self-reported degree of vertical integration involves some measurement errors, which biases the OLS estimates downward towards zero.
Checks on the Validity of the IV Estimation. The validity of the instrumental variable estimation is crucially reliant on the satisfaction of the exclusion restriction, that is, our instrument does not a¤ect …rm productivity through channels other than the degree of vertical integration. Note that our instrumental variable estimation includes industry dummies, which effectively control for any technological di¤erences across industries that may lead to the endogenous determination of both local purchases and vertical integration. We have also included city dummies to control for any location advantages that may a¤ect local purchases, vertical integration and …rm performance. In addition to these controls, we conduct two more sets of robustness checks on the exclusion restriction condition. First, we identify four possible channels other than vertical integration through which the instrument may a¤ect …rm performance and then explicitly control for these channels in the IV estimation. For example, when a …rm sources more of its parts and components locally, it may incur lower transportation costs, which subsequently leads to better …rm performance. Similarly, the shorter distance to suppliers in the case of local sourcing implies less of a need for inventory, which then leads to better performance. It is also possible that locally purchased inputs are made to …rms' unique speci…cations, which adds more value to their …nal products. Finally, local purchases could reduce delays in delivery and consequently minimize lost sales.
We employ the SCE data set to construct four variables corresponding to each of these four possible alternative channels: Transportation Cost (measured by transportation costs divided by sales), Inventory (measured by inventory stocks of …nal goods over sales), Input Speci…city (measured by the percentage of a …rm's inputs made to the …rm's unique speci…cations) and Delivery Loss (measured by the percentage of sales lost due to delivery delays in the previous year). Meanwhile, to take into account the possibility that these channels may have a non-linear e¤ect on …rm productivity, we include both the single and quadratic terms of these channel variables in the IV estimation. As shown in Columns 1-5 of Table 4 , our main results regarding the impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity remain robust to these additional controls for possible alternative channels through which the instrument may a¤ect …rm productivity.
Second, we follow Angrist and Pischke (2009) in conducting a falsi…cation test. The premise of the falsi…cation test is that if there are some variables not supposed to be a¤ected by an endogenous variable, then a reduced-form regression of those variables on instruments of the endogenous variable should not produce any signi…cant association.
Speci…cally, the SCE has a question asking the …rm "According to your tax reporting requirements do you have to use a cash register or other electronic devices?" The tax reporting device (cash register or other electronic device) is a variable not supposed to be a¤ected by the endogenous variable of this study (degree of vertical integration). This is because no …rm, whatever its degree of vertical integration, would insist on using a particular reporting device not required by the tax authority. Moreover, it is inconceivable that the tax authority would impose a speci…c reporting device obligation based on the …rm's degree of vertical integration. When regressing the tax reporting device on the instrument (i.e., Local Purchase) of the endogenous variable, we indeed …nd a highly insigni…cant correlation with a p-value of 0.73 (Column 6 of Table 4 ), implying that the instrument passes the falsi…cation test of Angrist and Pischke (2009).
Robustness Checks
One possible concern is that our results could be driven by a few outlying observations. To address this concern, we exclude the top and bottom 1% of observations for …rm productivity and repeat the analysis using both OLS and IV regression methods. As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 , our main results regarding the impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity remain robust to these exercises, implying that the concern over outliers is not valid in our case.
We then carry out the analysis using two sub-samples. For …rms with many businesses, the degree of vertical integration could vary from one business to another. Thus, our measure of vertical integration may re ‡ect the average degree of vertical integration across various businesses, which may bias our estimations of the impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity. To alleviate this concern, we focus on the sub-sample of …rms with focused business (de…ned as …rms whose main business accounts for more than 50% of total sales). As shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 , our main …ndings remain robust in this sub-sample. Meanwhile, China's state-owned enterprises are legacies of its central planning system and have borne heavy social responsibilities. As a result, they tend to be vertically integrated and ine¢ cient. To ensure that our results are not driven by these state-owned enterprises, we focus on the sub-sample of private …rms. As shown in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 , our main …ndings regarding the negative impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity remain robust in this sub-sample.
Discussion
While the SCE data set includes a direct measure of vertical integration, the cross-sectional nature of the data precludes the possibility of comparing the performance of the same …rm but with di¤erent degrees of vertical integration and therefore the analysis may su¤er from the Coase meets Heckman problem. The use of the instrumental variable estimation may address this endogeneity problem, provided that the instrumental variable is (conditionally) exogenous. Our instrumental variable is constructed in line with both theoretical and empirical work on the theory of the …rm. And in the analysis, we have controlled for a list of variables including industry dummies, city dummies and CEO and …rm characteristics, and conducted several robustness checks. Nonetheless, concerns regarding the exogeneity of the instrumental variable may still remain. In what follows, we use two additional data sets and several panel estimation methods that o¤er alternative ways of addressing the Coase meets Heckman problem.
Analysis Using ASIF Data Set

Main Results
We now turn to the ASIF data set to investigate the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance. As the ASIF data set is a panel data set, we have the following regression speci…cation:
where Y f;t is the productivity of …rm f in year t; V I f;t is the value added ratio of …rm f in year t, measuring the degree of vertical integration; f is the …rm dummy, capturing all time-invariant …rm characteristics; and t is the year dummy, capturing all the e¤ects a¤ecting …rms in year t. Standard errors are clustered at the …rm-level to deal with the potential heteroskedasticity problem.
We …rst report the pooled OLS estimation results in Column 1 of Table  6 , in which we replace …rm dummy f in equation (2) with a full set of 4-digit industry and province dummies. We …nd that Value Added Ratio has a negative and statistically signi…cant estimated coe¢ cient, consistent with our …ndings obtained using the SCE data set.
The pooled OLS estimation in Column 1 is essentially analogous to the analysis conducted using the SCE data set, in which we compare the performance of di¤erent …rms. To address the Coase meets Heckman problem, we carry out the panel …xed e¤ect (FE) estimation of equation (2), in which the inclusion of …rm dummy f allows us to control for all time-invariant …rm-level unobserved variables such as the level of transaction di¢ culty …rm f faces when determining its degree of vertical integration (Gibbons, 1999) . Hence, we can examine the performance change of same …rms when they encounter change in the degree of vertical integration over the sample period.
As shown in Column 2 of Table 6 , the estimated coe¢ cient of Value Added Ratio is still negative and statistically signi…cant, suggesting that our results are robust to the comparison of the performance of the same …rm but with di¤erent degrees of vertical integration. Note, however, that the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient falls from -1.274 to -0.627. This drop in magnitude could be attributed to the control for time-invariant …rm-level unobserved characteristics (e.g., the level of transaction di¢ culty) correlated with both the degree of vertical integration and …rm productivity. It is also possible that some variations in the degree of vertical integration occur at the inter-…rm rather than the intra…rm level, as a result of which intra…rm variations have a muted impact on …rm productivity in the panel …xed e¤ect estimation.
Note that while the panel …xed-e¤ect estimation allows for e¤ective control of all time-invariant …rm-level characteristics, it is more susceptible to measurement errors such as noise in annual variations in the data set (such as in …rm productivity), which may drive the estimated coe¢ cient downward to zero (e.g., Griliches and Hausman, 1986) . As a way of checking whether measurement errors are a serious problem in our estimation, we follow Griliches and Hausman (1986) in using an alternative means of estimating the panel regression -…rst-di¤erence (FD) regression. More speci…cally, we estimate the following FD equation:
where is the FD operation, i.e., Y f;t Y f;t Y f;t 3 . FD regression results reported in Column 3 of Table 6 show that the coe¢ cient of Value Added Ratio remains negative and statistically signi…cant, suggesting that the measurement error problem is not a major concern.
While we have controlled for all time-invariant …rm-level unobservable through the panel …xed-e¤ect estimation and the FD estimation, there could still be a concern over time-varying omitted variables bias. One proxy for all these time-varying omitted variables is the lagged dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2002) . Hence, we estimate the following equation:
The estimation results are reported in Column 4 of Table 6 . Clearly, even with the control for time-varying unobservable, the impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity remains negative and statistically signi…cant. Furthermore, with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the panel estimation, we may face a problem of dynamic estimation bias whereby the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, thus leading to biased estimates. To address this concern, we conduct a panel instrumentalvariable estimation a là Anderson and Hsiao (1982) . More speci…cally, in the FD transformation of equation (4), we instrument V I f;t and Y f;t 1 with V I f;t 1 and Y f;t 2 , respectively. The Anderson-Hsiao IV estimation results are reported in Column 5 of Table 6 . Clearly, our main …ndings regarding the negative impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity remain robust to this IV estimation.
Robustness Checks
First, to address the concern that …rm entry and exit during the sample period may drive our …ndings, we restrict our analysis to a balanced panel, comprising …rms existing for the whole sample period. The panel …xed-e¤ect and Anderson-Hsiao IV estimation results are reported in Columns 1-2 of Table 7 . It is clear that our main …ndings are robust in balanced sub-sample.
Second, we exclude the top and bottom 1% of observations for …rm productivity to check whether our results are mainly driven by outlying observations. The panel …xed-e¤ect and Anderson-Hsiao IV estimation results are reported in Columns 3-4 of Table 7 . It is clear that our main …ndings are robust to the exclusion of outlying observations. Third, in the context of China, one may be concerned that our results are driven by state-owned enterprises, which are usually less productive but highly integrated. To address this concern, we restrict our analysis to a sub-sample of private …rms. The panel …xed-e¤ect and Anderson-Hsiao IV estimation results are reported in Columns 5-6 of Table 7 . Again our main …ndings are robust in the sub-sample of private …rms.
Fourth, to account for the within-industry …rm heterogeneity in technologies (which could in turn a¤ect …rm productivity and ownership structure), we include Capital Intensity (measured as the logarithm of assets per worker) as an additional control. The panel …xed-e¤ect and Anderson-Hsiao IV estimation results are reported in Columns 7-8 of Table 7 , showing that our main …ndings are robust to this additional control.
Discussion
The advantage of the ASIF data set comes from its panel data feature, which allows us to use a variety of panel estimation methods to address the Coase meets Heckman problem. Speci…cally, we are able to compare the performance of a …rm with that of the same …rm when it experiences some change in the degree of vertical integration. Consistent with our …ndings obtained using the SCE data set, both the pooled OLS (analogous to the benchmark estimation speci…cation with the SCE data set) and the panel estimations indicate that vertical integration has a negative and signi…cant impact on …rm productivity.
The drawback of this data set is that it contains only standard …rm-level …nancial information, for which we can use only the value added ratio to measure the degree of vertical integration. As this measure is shown to be sensitive to the stage of production process in which the …rm specializes, it may lead to a concern over possible bias in our estimation results. This concern is, however, partially alleviated by our control for either a detailed set of 4-digit industry dummies or …rm dummies.
Nonetheless, in what follows, we use a third data set that both o¤ers a better measure of the degree of vertical integration and allows us to use panel estimation method to address the Coase meets Heckman identi…cation problem.
Analysis Using PESPIC Data Set
Main Results
We now turn to the PESPIC data set as the …nal basis for investigating the impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity. The PESPIC data set comprises cross-country data, which o¤ers us an opportunity to test the generality of our earlier results obtained using the two China data sets. More importantly, it includes survey information on the change from outsourcing to in-house production of major production activities, which allows us to construct a measure of vertical integration that is more direct than the Value Added Ratio variable employed in Section 2.2 and is arguably more accurate than the Self-Made Input Percentage measure used in Section 2.1. Speci…cally, we estimate the following equation:
in which Y f;t is the change in …rm productivity, V I f;t is the change in the degree of vertical integration for major production activities, and X 0 f;t 3 is a vector of initial …rm-level variables (Initial Firm Size and Initial Sales Change) to alleviate the concern that the change in the degree of vertical integration is endogenous. Standard errors are clustered at the …rm-level to deal with the potential heteroskedasticity problem. FD estimation results of equation (5) are reported in Column 1 of Table 8. The coe¢ cient of the Change in Vertical Integration is negative and statistically signi…cant, suggesting that bringing major production activities in-house leads to a decrease in …rm productivity.
Note that while FD estimation allows us to e¤ectively control for all time-invariant characteristics, there could still be some time-varying characteristics correlated with the change in vertical integration, which would then lead to biased estimates. To address this concern, we include several measures of important operational changes in the past three years as robustness checks.
The PESPIC data set contains the following questions: (1) "Has your company introduced any new technology that has substantially changed the way that the main product is produced in the last three years?"; (2) "Has your company agreed any new joint venture with a foreign partner in the last three years?"; (3) "Has your company obtained any new licensing agreement in the last three years?"; and (4) "Has your company developed any major new product line in the last three years?". Accordingly, we construct four control variables -Introduction of New Technology, Introduction of New Joint Venture, Introduction of New Licensing Agreement, and Introduction of New Major Product Line -each of which takes the value of 1 if the …rm replies a¢ rmatively to the respective question and 0 otherwise. In addition, we construct a variable related to the change in capital intensity (i.e., measured as the change in logarithm of assets per worker) to control for possible withinindustry heterogeneity in technologies.
We include these …ve additional control variables in the model in a stepwise manner in Columns 2-6 of Table 8 . Our regressor of interest, Change in Vertical Integration, continues to produce a negative and statistically significant impact on …rm productivity, implying the robustness of our …ndings in Column 1 to possible time-varying characteristics.
Robustness Checks
Before concluding our analysis with the PESPIC data set, we conduct two further robustness checks. First, one might be concerned that our results could be driven by a few outlying observations. To address this possibility, we exclude the top and bottom 1% of observations for …rm productivity and repeat the analysis. As shown in Column 1 of Table 9 , our results remain robust to this exercise, implying that the concern over outliers is not valid in our case.
Second, casual observations suggest that state-owned enterprises in developing countries tend to be ine¢ cient, yet they shoulder their social responsibilities by becoming more vertically integrated, which may explain the negative impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity. To ensure that our results are not driven by the presence of state-owned enterprises, we focus on a sub-sample of private …rms. As shown in Column 2 of Table 9 , our main …ndings regarding the negative impact of vertical integration on …rm productivity remain robust in this sub-sample.
Conclusion
Many decades of theoretical and empirical research have given us a much better understanding of what determines the vertical boundary of the …rm. The next agenda item is to examine the impact of vertical boundary decisions on …rm performance. However, this line of research encounters two major challenges: how to measure the degree of vertical integration, and how to address the endogeneity of the vertical boundary decision.
This paper investigates the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance using three di¤erent data sets that complement each other in addressing both the variable measurement and endogeneity problems. Speci…cally, we use the conventional measure of vertical integration (the value added ratio) and two alternative measures based on survey questions explicitly designed to measure vertical integration. We also experiment with the instrumental variable estimation and a variety of panel estimation methods to deal with the endogeneity problem. Throughout our analysis, we consistently …nd that the degree of vertical integration has a negative and statistically significant impact on …rm productivity. Our …ndings on the positive impact of outsourcing on …rm performance may partially explain the surge in the use of outsourcing across countries and industries.
This paper contributes to the literature by being one of the few attempts to examine the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance rather than the anti-competitive implications of mergers and acquisitions of vertically related businesses. Moreover, our study is among the …rst investigations based on a range of manufacturing industries rather than being an industryspeci…c analysis as are most studies in this line of research. Furthermore, it represents one of the few studies that carefully address both the variable measurement and endogeneity problems arising in identifying the impact of vertical integration on …rm performance. Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are presented in the bracket. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
